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CAN THE VICE PRESIDENT PRESIDE AT HIS OWN 
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL?: A CRITIQUE OF BARE TEXTUALISM 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
Turn the clock back for a moment to August 1973.  In the midst of the 
burgeoning Watergate scandal, the nation discovered that Vice President Spiro 
T. Agnew was being investigated for allegedly accepting bribes from 
contractors, and for committing tax fraud while Governor of Maryland and 
Vice President.  The investigation, by attorneys in the United States Attorneys 
Office in Maryland, ultimately gathered sufficient evidence to present to a 
grand jury.  To avoid the spectre of likely indictment and prosecution, Agnew 
elected to resign his office and plead nolo contendere.1 
But suppose Agnew had decided not to go quietly.2  Instead of resigning 
and pleading, imagine he decided to go to Congress, to challenge the House to 
impeach him and, if it did, the Senate to convict him.  Although this possibility 
may seem far-fetched now, Agnew did at one point appear headed in that 
direction.3  Suppose the House had charged Agnew with committing 
impeachable crimes that, if proven, justified his removal.  As the House 
considered impeaching President Nixon, the Senate would have faced a trial to 
determine whether Agnew, the person first in line to succeed Nixon, must be 
removed. 
As the Senate began its deliberations, with Senate president pro tempore 
James Eastland presiding, let us suppose Agnew entered the Senate chamber 
and strolled to the front.  “I’m here to preside,” Agnew told a startled Eastland.  
“Give me the gavel.  Get out of my chair.”  Agnew’s presence in and of itself, 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  It is a pleasure to join so many 
colleagues in contributing this essay to this issue of the Saint Louis University Law Journal in 
honor of Professor Eileen Searls.  Her commitment to our Law School, her extraordinary 
contributions to our Library, and her many kindnesses have enriched our careers and inspired 
similar conduct in others. 
  I am grateful to Patricia Fitzsimmons and John Howard for research assistance and to 
Mary Dougherty for retyping this essay.  Shortcomings are my responsibility. 
 1. See RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE 
INVESTIGATION & RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW (1974). 
 2. SPIRO T. AGNEW, GO QUIETLY . . . OR ELSE  (1980). 
 3. This supposition is not far-fetched.  In fact, Agnew toyed with the idea of asking the 
House for a hearing barely two weeks before he resigned.  See COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 
1, at 253-57. 
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was something of a surprise. During the twentieth century, the Vice President’s 
role as the Senate’s presiding officer had atrophied.  Like other Vice 
Presidents, Agnew had spent little time discharging the one on-going 
responsibility the original Constitution gave them.4  In the twentieth century, 
the Vice Presidency had become essentially an executive office.5 Still, the 
Constitution provides that the Vice President shall be President of the Senate,6 
and Agnew, in this fantasy, was ready to do that duty—insistent on doing it, in 
fact. 
Now most of us pondering this hypothetical situation would probably be 
inclined to react, “No way, José.  Agnew can’t preside at his own trial.”  Yet if 
we went looking to the text of the Constitution to confirm our intuition, our 
next reaction might well be “Eastland, we’ve got a problem.” 
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen recently imagined a scenario like this, 
examined the text of the Constitution, and, in a clever article, suggested that 
the Constitution would permit the Vice President of the United States to 
preside over his own impeachment trial.7  “Now that’s stupid,” concluded 
Professor Paulsen, in nominating this result for a coveted spot on the list of 
“Constitutional Stupidities.”8  Professor Paulsen is not the first prominent 
scholar to express this conclusion.  In 1983, Professor Stephen L. Carter 
concluded “that the Vice President could preside at his own impeachment trial, 
should he choose to do so,” a conclusion he described as one of  “a few glaring 
errors” the founders made.9  Seven years later, he confidently repeated his 
claim that “[t]he founders designed a Constitution in which the Vice President 
presides at his own impeachment trial” as evidence of the interpretation of the 
document.10  Michael Gerhardt, a leading authority on impeachment, endorses 
this conclusion,11 as did Richard M. Pious,12 a foremost expert on the 
Presidency. 
 
 4. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 142-44 (1982). 
 5. See Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 505, 530, 544-46 (1995). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 7. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 245 (1997). 
 8. Id. at 246 & n.1. 
 9. Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the 
Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1357 & n.72 (1983). 
 10. Stephen Carter, The Role of the Courts in Separation of Powers Disputes, 68 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 669, 675 (1990). 
 11. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 65 (1996). 
 12. Richard M. Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and 
Popular Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 859, 862 n.15 (1999). 
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Surely most of us would agree that it would be tres stupide to let Spiro 
Agnew, or any Vice President, conduct his own trial.  Indeed, we would 
probably find that assessment not sufficiently severe.  For the nation to face the 
trauma of an impeachment trial of a bribe-accepting Vice President as a 
prelude to a similar proceeding concerning a justice-obstructing President 
would be bad enough.  To allow the alleged crook preside over his trial would 
test our faith in the wisdom of the founders. 
But, before we tag the founders with this blunder, it is worth asking 
whether the Constitution does, in fact, so provide.  One cannot lightly dismiss 
the conclusion of four such eminent scholars, even if it is a judgment on a 
question on which they did not set out to build their reputations.13  Is the 
Carter-Paulsen-Gerhardt-Pious verdict the most compelling constitutional 
conclusion?  Would the Constitution really sanction such a procedure, which 
they, and we, would agree is asinine? 
Now I know what you’re thinking, even those of you who may share my 
confidence that the Constitution does not mean what Professor Paulsen et al. 
suggests.  “Take a deep breath, Joel,” you counsel.  “Before you spin out 150 
footnotes that 250 million Americans will never read, answer me one question: 
Who cares?  Who cares whether the Constitution would let the Vice President 
run his own trial?  Certainly not Carter, who devoted a mere footnote to it 
seventeen years ago; not Paulsen, who gave only two pages to the topic in a 
forum he occasionally uses to advance witty constitutional interpretations.14  
And why should they?  Even if they’re right, so what?  As a practical matter, 
what Vice President would ever have the chutzpah, not to mention bad 
judgment, to try to run his own inquest?  All it shows, even if Carter et al. are 
right, is that the framers were fallible; like the rest of us, they made mistakes.  
 
 13. To be sure, the four did not think the topic worthy of a full-length exposition.  Professors 
Carter, Gerhardt and Pious basically covered it in a footnote; Paulsen was most loquacious, 
giving the topic two pages.  Several who have reached different conclusions have also managed 
to say their piece briefly.  See, e.g., John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of 
Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 457, 462 & n.30 (1964) (noting in 
text that “no presiding officer was mentioned for a trial of the Vice President” and in a footnote 
observing that “[p]resumably” the Senate President pro tempore would preside); Brian C. Kalt, 
Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 
795-96 & n.101 (1996) (criticizing Vice-President-Presides thesis in one paragraph); Akhil Reed 
Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 113, 122 n.59 (1995) (same). 
 14. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for 
President Strom Thurmond, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 217 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, I’m 
Even Smarter than Bruce Ackerman: Why the President Can Veto His Own Impeachment, 16 
CONST. COMMENTARY 1 (1999).  It is possible that Professor Paulsen is kidding here, too.  If so, 
his satire is more subtle than I can process.  In any event, he is not alone in offering this 
constitutional interpretation as a valid one but is joined by other thoughtful scholars. 
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But who ever could have thought they were perfect?  Fortunately, this 
“mistake” is one that won’t come home to roost.” 
Now I agree with most of this.  (After all, I wrote it).  Whether Agnew 
could have presided is not one of the two or three most urgent topics in 
constitutional law.  Historical circumstance has never forced us to address the 
question, and propriety and common sense make it unlikely that we will.  The 
republic will not fall if the Vice President-Presides thesis stands unchallenged. 
But this thesis does raise another, and a rather basic, issue in American 
government—how should one go about interpreting the Constitution?  Both 
Professors Carter and Paulsen rely exclusively on textual arguments to reach 
and defend their conclusion here under discussion.15  But what is the proper 
role of textual analysis in searching for constitutional meaning especially 
where, as is the case here, the text speaks only indirectly to a subject and the 
conclusion it might support, is, as Professor Paulsen aptly put it, “stupid?” 
In recent years, textual arguments have made something of a comeback in 
constitutional interpretation.  Whereas much constitutional argument was 
conducted not so long ago with little reference to the text, judicial and 
academic discussions now stress textual arguments.16  The Vice President-
Presides conclusion makes manifest a weakness in certain applications of 
textual argument.  It provides us with a cautionary tale about the way in which 
clever textual arguments, disembodied from other constitutional anchors, can 
mislead.  Rather than relying solely on the text where, as here, it speaks 
indirectly and unclearly, a more appropriate mode of constitutional 
interpretation would also consider other types of constitutional argument to 
reach a conclusion.  Such an approach has been formulated by leading 
constitutional theorists.17  It would not support the Vice President-Presides 
result. 
This essay begins by outlining the similar arguments that Professors Carter 
and Paulsen advance which rely exclusively on textual analysis.  It then briefly 
discusses whether the issue is a political question.  After briefly describing 
other types of conventional constitutional arguments the authors might have 
used to address this topic, the essay shows how these arguments would have 
presented a fuller and more satisfactory constitutional conclusion. 
 
 15. Professors Gerhardt and Pious simply state the conclusion in passing. 
 16. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Clinton v. New 
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of 
Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993); Edwin Meese, III, 
The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13 
and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989). 
 17. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987). 
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I. PROFESSOR PAULSEN’S ANALYSIS 
Professor Paulsen points out that the Constitution provides that the Vice 
President “shall be President of the Senate.”18  The Senate’s power to make its 
rules of proceeding, Professor Paulsen argues, “cannot be used to strip the Vice 
President of his specific constitutional prerogative . . . .”19  Since the 
Constitution grants the Vice President the power to preside, only some 
constitutional exception can limit this grant.  To be sure, the Constitution, in 
two separate places, mentions instances when the Vice President does not 
preside.  In the President Pro Tempore Clause,20 Professor Paulsen points out, 
the Constitution empowers the Senate to choose “a President pro tempore, in 
the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of 
President of the United States.”  But a Vice President under trial is certainly 
not exercising the Office of President (let us hope).  And, Professor Paulsen 
points out, a Vice President attending his Senate trial is not absent from its 
chamber.21 
The Constitution also provides that when the Senate tries the President on 
impeachment, “the Chief Justice shall preside,” not the vice president.22  But 
the text does not withdraw the Vice President’s right to preside when he is 
tried for impeachment.  Thus, Professor Paulsen argues the “Chief Justice shall 
preside” clause encourages the inference that the framers did not intend to 
disqualify the Vice President from presiding over his own trial.  “Applying the 
principle of expressio unius, it is clear that if the framers had meant to 
disqualify the Vice President in the case of his own impeachment, they would 
have said so.”23 
Professor Carter’s discussion, though more abbreviated, generally follows 
the same lines.  His conclusion—the Vice President can preside at his own 
impeachment trial—rests on four propositions.  1) The Vice President is 
President of the Senate; 2) The Constitution only requires the Vice President 
“to turn over the gavel to another individual” when the Senate tries the 
President; 3) the Vice President, too, is subject to impeachment and Senate 
trial; 4) Since the Constitution does not require the Vice President to relinquish 
his chair during his trial he may preside over it.24 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 19. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 245. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. 
 21. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 245. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 23. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 246. 
 24. Carter, Political Aspects, supra note 9, at 1357, n.72. 
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II. A POLITICAL QUESTION? 
Now, it is perhaps tempting to think constitutionalists may be able to avoid 
the merits of this issue by resorting to that familiar filter, the case or 
controversy requirement.  The courts have articulated several factors which 
may render an issue nonjusticiable or not fit for adjudication.25  It is quite 
possible that a court, if presented with the issue, would regard it as a political 
question beyond judicial competence.  Indeed, in Nixon v. United States,26 the 
Supreme Court held that at least some issues relating to impeachment are 
political questions which courts cannot decide on the merits.  Judge Walter L. 
Nixon, Jr. had challenged a Senate rule which allowed a Senate committee, 
instead of the whole body, to listen to and observe witnesses and issue a report 
to the Senate pertinent to his impeachment.  Judge Nixon complained that this 
procedure violated the Impeachment Trial Clause which provides that “[t]he 
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”27  What “try” meant 
in the Senate impeachment clause was a political question, the Court held. 
The Court gave various reasons for its conclusion, but at least four would 
seem to preclude judicial review of a decision regarding who would preside 
over Agnew’s impeachment.  First, based on the historical record, the Court 
found no evidence the framers intended judicial review of impeachment.28  
Second, the Court deemed questions regarding impeachment nonjusticiable, 
because finality was required for presidential impeachment.  It simply would 
not do to have the nation endure a protracted period in which the courts 
adjudicated whether a President had been wrongfully removed from office.  
The Court seemed to imply that since the Constitution does not distinguish 
between impeachment proceedings for the President and federal judges in this 
respect at least, the same concerns which would preclude review of a 
presidential impeachment would inhibit judicial review of Judge Nixon’s 
trial.29  If that consideration prevented review of an impeachment of a district 
court judge it would apply all the more so to impeachment of a Vice President, 
especially one only an impeachment-and-conviction-of-Richard-M.-Nixon 
away from the Presidency.  Moreover, the court feared judicial review of 
impeachments would slide it down a slippery slope.  Certain remedial 
problems could arise.  Could a court order a removed federal judge reinstated?  
Could it direct Congress to create another judgeship if Judge Nixon’s spot was 
filled?30  Finally, the court concluded that it would be inappropriate for the 
 
 25. See, e.g., NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, 
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24-46 (2d ed. 1999). 
 26. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 28. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 233-34. 
 29. Id. at 236. 
 30. Id. 
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judiciary to review an impeachment conviction since it might later preside over 
a criminal prosecution of the same officer.31  In Agnew’s case, that would 
hardly have been a hypothetical concern.  Indeed, a full scale investigation was 
underway and the Department of Justice was prepared to seek an indictment. 
Of course, the issue here differs from that in Nixon in two obvious 
respects.  First, some different parts of the constitutional text are involved.  In 
Nixon, the Court held that the language giving the Senate “the sole power to try 
all Impeachments” did not implicitly require “that the proceedings must be in 
the nature of a judicial trial.”32  It reached that conclusion in part because the 
Constitution explicitly imposed three requirements on the Senate—that its 
members be under oath or affirmation, that the Chief Justice preside over 
presidential impeachments, and that a two-thirds vote be required for 
conviction;33 the perceived precision of these limits caused the court to 
conclude that “the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on 
the form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the word ‘try’ . . . .”34  On the 
other hand, advocates of the Vice President-Presides interpretation might argue 
that this situation is different, and accordingly would be justiciable, for two 
reasons.  A separate clause of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Vice 
President of the United States shall be President of the Senate.”35  The effort to 
oust Agnew would arguably conflict with that entitlement.  Accordingly, this 
issue involves a discrete clause which requires judicial interpretation.  
Moreover, one of the three limitations—the Chief Justice shall preside when 
the President is impeached—arguably implies that when someone else is 
impeached no special arrangements are required. 
Moreover, some considerations regarding checks and balances, which 
influenced the Court in Nixon do not apply so forcefully here.  There the Court 
concluded that judicial review of judicial impeachments was contrary to the 
basic system of checks and balances, since “impeachment was designed to be 
the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature.”36  It would not do to 
leave the checkee power to review checkers.  But here that constraint would 
not arise.  On the contrary, here the parties disputing the coveted right to 
preside presumably would be the Vice President, a member of the Executive 
Branch, and the President pro tempore of the Senate.  The Court would umpire 
this dispute not involving a judicial officer.  The system of judicial checks and 
balances would not be undermined. 
 
 31. Id. at 234. 
 32. Id. at 229. 
 33. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230. 
 34. Id. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 36. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 235. 
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The possibility the issue poses a political question offers no easy escape 
from this riddle.  First, the Court might reject the political question escape, in 
which case it would have to address the merits.  Moreover, the fact that a court 
deems an issue a political question does not mean the Constitution does not 
address it.  It simply may mean the Constitution speaks in a language judges 
cannot or will not interpret.  The Constitution speaks to Congressmen as well 
as to judges; they, too, are duty bound to act consistently with its directions.  
Somebody (other than just law professors) would need to address the 
constitutional question and act accordingly.  The Vice President-Presides 
analysis, therefore,  requires consideration on the merits.  Accordingly, we are 
left with the question of how we should interpret the Constitution in such a 
case. 
III. MODES OF INTERPRETATION 
The conclusion that Professor Paulsen et al. reach rests entirely on textual 
analysis.  Textual arguments use fragments of the constitutional document to 
support conclusions about constitutionality.  Although usage admits different 
understandings of textual arguments, generally speaking they address “the 
present sense of the words” of some provision.37 
In recent years, textualism has gained new prominence, and appropriately 
so.  It is, after all, a constitution being interpreted, and that implies some 
measure of fidelity to its text.  Clearly, the words of the document are not 
irrelevant; far from it.  But to acknowledge their relevance is not to treat them 
as invariably dispositive. 
In fact, constitutional interpretation resorts to a battery of modes of 
constitutional arguments,38 only one of which emphasizes the text.  Those 
engaged in constitutional analysis often invoke three types of historical 
argument.  They often identify the Constitution’s meaning with the intent of 
the founders, the drafters and/or ratifiers of the document.  Although 
shortcomings of originalism have not remained secret,39 judicial and academic 
discussions generally pay some homage to the founders’ intent.  A second type 
of historical argument, on-going history, though less prominent, also appears in 
discussions of constitutional meaning.40  It rests upon the premise that 
constitutional meaning can emerge from the repeated practices of 
governmental institutions which are accepted and relied on over time. 
 
 37. BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 7. 
 38. See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 17; Fallon, supra note 17; MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & 
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (1993); 
REDLICH, ATTANASIO & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 2-4. 
 39. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,  60 B.U. 
L. REV. 204 (1980). 
 40. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-13 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Precedent constitutes a third type of constitutional argument.  Much 
constitutional discussion addresses not what the text says but rather the 
doctrines judges have crafted during the last two centuries.  Terms like “strict 
scrutiny,” “over breadth,” or “clear and present danger” are not found in the 
text of the Constitution; rather they are part of the gloss judges have placed on 
it.  Like originalism and on-going history, judicial doctrine really reflects an 
historical approach to constitutional analysis.  It differs, however, in its focus 
on the role of judges in shaping constitutional meaning, an emphasis our 
common law experience supports and which Marbury v. Madison41 
reinforces.42 
Structural arguments represent another common mode of constitutional 
interpretation.  “Structural arguments are claims that a particular principle or 
practical result is implicit in the structures of government and the relationships 
that are created by the Constitution among citizens and governments.”43  
Structural argument enjoys the advantage that it may sometimes produce 
rational and satisfying answers to questions in situations where textual analysis 
may suggest preposterous answers.  As Charles L. Black, Jr., the dean of 
structuralists put it:44 
I am inclined to think well of the method of reasoning from structure and 
relation.  I think well of it, above all, because to succeed it has to make sense - 
current, practical sense.  The textual-explication method, operating on general 
language, may often - perhaps more often than not - be made to make sense, by 
legitimate enough devices of interpretation.  But it contains within itself no 
guarantee that it will make sense, for a court may always present itself or even 
see itself as being bound by the stated intent, however nonsensical, of 
somebody else. 
The Agnew-Could-Preside argument suffers from the fact that it rests 
entirely on a textual argument.  To be sure, the text is not a bad place to rest if 
the props are sturdy and not easily shaken.  When the support does not enjoy 
that advantage, textual arguments need reinforcement.  Conformity, in 
constitutional interpretation and elsewhere, may not be an unmitigated virtue 
but occasionally it does have its merits.  The fact that judicial and scholarly 
discussions generally invoke several types of appeals suggests that many are 
pluralistic in their taste in constitutional arguments.  The descriptive fact that 
 
 41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 42. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 877 (1996). 
 43. BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 7. 
 44. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28 
(1969). 
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constitutional interpretation in practice generally enlists multiple types of 
arguments lends some support to that methodology.45 
Considering different types of arguments often helps us better understand 
constitutional meaning.  Even if clear textual language should be followed, 
exploring other modes of argument may help determine what the text means.  
What the framers intended the text to mean may shed some light on what it 
does mean.  So, too, what interested parties and judges have thought the 
Constitution means may help us understand what it means today.  Similarly, 
the structures and relations the text suggests may illuminate a phrase under 
consideration.  Thus, exploring other types of arguments serves a useful 
function.  When we are uncertain about what the text means, these other 
conventional types of arguments may help us understand.  If we feel certain 
regarding the text’s meaning, they may furnish a useful check.  When all or 
most of the other conventional arguments point in the same direction, it may 
appropriately fortify our commitment to that conclusion.  On the other hand, 
when the other modes suggest a different answer, perhaps our first read of the 
text should not be our last.46 
It is worth consciously considering other types of arguments for another 
reason.  Interpretation requires not only a text but a reader.  When we read a 
provision of the Constitution we do so, consciously or not, against a 
background of knowledge and understanding.  We often know, when we read 
the text, how the provision has been interpreted and perhaps what the founders 
thought; structural arguments may also inform our understanding.  Thus, we 
may find the text clear not only because it is clear but also because nothing in 
our experience or knowledge clouds our understanding of its language.  As an 
example, consider the constitutional provisions relating to the Electoral 
College.47  We might conclude that the text clearly allows a candidate with 
fewer popular votes but more electoral votes to become President not only 
because its language so suggests but also because this meaning fits with our 
knowledge of the framers’ intent and comports with our nation’s actual 
experience. 
Resort to arguments in addition to the text also contributes to civic 
education.  Constitutional argument is one important way in which we seek to 
understand the essence of our nation.  That discussion becomes far richer and 
more productive if not confined to textual exegesis.  We are likely to be more 
convinced that the Constitution is being expounded correctly when a proffered 
interpretation comports with, say, the framers’ intent, ongoing practice, judicial 
doctrine, structural ideas, and good sense. 
 
 45. On the efficacy of practice based theory, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a 
Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999). 
 46. See generally Fallon, supra note 17. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; amend. XII. 
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Finally, a pluralistic approach to constitutional decision-making is needed 
because the text often is not alone dispositive.  Try as we might to find answers 
in the text, we sometimes find it mute or garbled with respect to problems we 
face.  This is not to say that the text has no importance in these instances when 
it gives uncertain direction.  It remains a touchstone of interpretation, a 
necessary starting point which sets some boundaries to channel discussion and 
behavior.48 
Some clauses of the Constitution confer some general power or status, or 
impose some general limit without addressing a specific problem that 
eventually arises.  On occasion, the difficulty is not so much that the 
Constitution speaks to a problem in an ambiguous voice; it is rather that we 
cannot be sure that the text really speaks to the specific problem under 
discussion.  In these instances in particular, textual analysis can  mislead, not 
reveal.  In such cases, the inferences which pieces of text might suggest may 
lead us astray.  But, the other modes of constitutional argument, which judges 
and constitutional lawyers typically employ, may help suggest a resolution. 
The textual argument here is not dispositive as its proponents suggest.  The 
Paulsen et al. thesis is a clever interpretation of textual fragments.  But it is not 
the only viable reading.  The Vice President-Presides thesis clashes with the 
conclusions other types of arguments suggest.  It is worth considering other 
data to interpret the Constitution even for a question as remote from actual 
experience as whether Agnew could have presided (had he sought to) at his 
impeachment trial (had he not resigned and been impeached).  
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT-PRESIDES THESIS 
To be sure, Professor Paulsen is right when he points out that “[n]owhere 
does the Constitution say that the Vice President is stripped of his power as 
presiding officer of the Senate just because the business at hand is his own 
impeachment trial.”49  Although the text does not say the Vice President cannot 
preside, it does not say that he can preside at his own trial either.  On the 
contrary, the text does not speak specifically to the subject of who presides 
when the vice president is tried. It is, in essence, silent.  Accordingly, we 
cannot determine whether Agnew can preside over his own trial simply by 
reading the text; we must invoke other tools of constitutional analysis. 
Now Professor Paulsen et al. might contest this point by arguing that since 
the text names the Vice President as President of the Senate it is not totally 
silent regarding whether the Vice President can preside at his own trial.  The 
Vice President is entitled to preside unless some specific text withdraws that 
power.  The President of the Senate clause tilts the scale in favor of the Vice 
President; he should benefit from a presumption. 
 
 48. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 428-29 (1985). 
 49. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 245. 
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This swing does not quite ring the bell.  There are several answers.  First, 
the President of the Senate Clause may be understood simply as conferring an 
office on the Vice President without defining the scope of his duties.  In other 
words, that clause may simply designate the Vice President as the Senate’s 
president without specifying the full scope50 of his authority.51  Under this 
approach, Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, or perhaps the 
Senate, would retain authority to structure the vice president’s powers. 
Alternatively, the President of the Senate Clause is at best a general grant 
of power.  It tells us generally that the Vice President is President of the Senate 
but it does not address whether he can preside over his own inquest.  The 
President of the Senate Clause might have read: 
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate in 
which capacity he shall have the right to preside over its deliberations in all 
cases, including when he shall be tried for impeachment subject to the Chief 
Justice Clause and the President pro tempore clause. 
In that event, the text at least would address the problem.  But here the very 
generality of the clause might reasonably send us searching for other clues to 
provide a more specific authorization before allowing the Vice President to do 
something as bizarre as presiding at his own trial. 
But the President of the Senate Clause is not the only textual fragment 
pertinent to this issue.  The President Pro Tempore Clause empowers the 
Senate to choose a president pro tempore to preside “in the absence of the vice 
president or when he shall exercise the office of president of the United 
States.”52 Clearly Agnew was not exercising presidential powers.  But if he 
was absent during his impeachment trial the Constitution would specifically 
authorize the president pro tempore to preside. 
Of course, the Vice President presumably would attend his impeachment 
trial, and accordingly Professor Paulsen argues he would not be “‘absent’ when 
he’s before the Senate for his impeachment trial . . . .”53  Since he is not absent, 
the president pro tempore cannot preside. Whether Professor Paulsen is right 
depends on from what absence is measured.  If “absent” means “not present in 
the chamber,” then the Vice President under impeachment would not be absent 
if he attends the proceedings.  But alternatively absent may refer simply to 
absence from the presiding chair.  In that case, Vice President Agnew’s 
presence in the chamber would not necessarily mean he was entitled to preside.  
There might be situations when the Vice President were in the room but 
 
 50. The clause does emphasize that the vice president does not vote unless a tie occurs. 
 51. A similar argument is sometimes made regarding the vesting clause in Article II.  See, 
e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 4 (4th ed. 1957) 
(asking whether vesting clause constitutes “a mere designation of office”). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. 
 53. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 245. 
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necessarily absent from the chair.  The Constitution does not, on its face, 
resolve this question; it speaks simply of “the absence of the Vice President” as 
necessitating a president pro tempore, without specifying absences from what. 
This second meaning of absence, measured with reference to his 
availability to preside, would seem the more plausible one.  Two examples 
suggest why.  Presumably there are times when the president pro tempore or 
his designee presides while the Vice President makes his way to or from the 
presiding officer’s chair or stops to chat with a Senator or two.  The Vice 
President is present in the Senate but no one would argue that the president pro 
tempore cannot preside in these situations.  It is the Vice President’s absence 
from the chair that seems significant.  That certainly is the way Senate practice 
has interpreted the clause.  If the Vice President’s presence in the room does 
not disable the president pro tempore from presiding in this instance it should 
not do so simply because the Vice President attends his own trial.  In either 
case, the Vice President is present in the chamber but absent from the chair. 
Of course, there is a difference between these two situations.  When 
Agnew leaves the podium to kibbitz with some lucky senator54 he presumably 
is content to allow Eastland or some other member pound the gavel from the 
big chair.  But when he gets tried on impeachment he wants to make sure the 
trial is run right.  Accordingly, he is not content to allow Eastland or anyone 
else discharge the prerogatives of the chair.  In the first case, Agnew’s absence 
from the chair is voluntary; in the second, not. 
But it is not clear that this distinction should make any difference.  First, 
on a textual analysis, which is, after all, Professor Paulsen’s approach, the 
distinction is irrelevant.  The text empowers the president pro tempore to 
preside when the Vice President is absent.  It may make a difference from what 
he must be absent, i.e., the chamber or the chair, but the text is indifferent to 
the reason the Vice President is absent or his wishes regarding whether he 
presides.  In other words, the text does not make the right of the president pro 
tempore to preside dependent in any way on whether the Vice President wants 
to preside; it is simply a question of absence. 
Moreover, the Vice President’s physical presence, in the chamber or chair, 
and desire to preside cannot be the sole criteria of her right to preside.  Let us 
suppose that a Vice President entered the Senate chamber but was physically 
or mentally unable to preside.  Although she would be present at the Senate’s 
place of business, she would be incapable of conducting its business.  Surely 
the Senate would not be expected to dispense with functioning simply because 
 
 54. Agnew once left the chair to lobby Republican Senators to vote for a measure.  Senator 
Len Jordan of Idaho “chewed him out.”  The Republican leadership agreed to the Jordan rule – 
whenever Agnew lobbied them, they would vote the opposite way!  John Robert Greene, “I’ll 
Continue to Speak Out”: Spiro T. Agnew as Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE 
VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 127-28 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997). 
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a deranged Vice President showed up each day to preside even though too 
infirm or irrational to do so.  The Constitution would not tolerate such a result, 
for it would undermine critical structural principles of government.  It would, 
for instance, subvert the bicameral nature of the national legislative process.  
By disabling the Senate, it would, in effect, prevent Congress from legislating, 
or advising and consenting to treaties or appointments.  It would convert a 
tripartite system into a bipartite system thereby undermining basic principles of 
separation of powers and eliminating checks and balances.  It could also 
undermine the president who could not get advice and consent from a Senate to 
appoint executive or judicial officers or enter into treaties. 
The requisite “absence” empowers Eastland to preside.  But here, since 
Agnew wants to preside, his absence from the chair must be compelled.  Two 
paths take us to this destination.  For reasons developed below, I believe the 
Constitution precludes the Vice President from presiding at his own trial.  
Alternatively, one might conclude that the Constitution does not require 
Agnew to preside but does not proscribe it either.  In that event, Agnew’s 
absence from the chair could be compelled either by a Senate rule or by statute 
passed pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause.  All of this suggests that 
the text of the Constitution fails to commit us to the Agnew-gets-to-preside 
argument. 
Interestingly, the president pro tempore clause identifies two quite 
different contingencies when the president pro tempore presides.  One, 
discussed above, deals with the “absence” of the vice president; the other 
addresses situations in which the Vice President “shall exercise the office of 
president of the United States.”  The first clause is indifferent to why the Vice 
President is absent or what he is doing.  The point seems to be that just because 
the Vice President is absent, the Senate does not grind to a halt.  The show, not 
to mention the government, must go on.  The second clause proceeds from a 
totally different impulse.  It addresses one particular contingency in which a 
surrogate is required.  The implication is that a Vice President acting as 
President could not preside over the Senate even if not absent. 
But is that language necessary to disqualify from presiding over the Senate 
a Vice President exercising presidential powers? Suppose the framers left that 
clause out. Could a Vice President acting as President then preside over the 
Senate?  I doubt it.  Although the text would not dictate the result, the structure 
of the Constitution would.  The Constitution creates three separate branches of 
government and imposes a system of checks and balances inconsistent with 
parliamentary government.  Specific clauses reflect that aversion.  The 
Incompatibility Clause,55 for instance, precludes members of Congress from 
assuming executive or judicial offices.  It serves as a directive that executive 
and legislative personnel must be kept separate.  As Akhil Amar put it, “You 
 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
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can’t basically be at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue at once.”56  The 
possibility that an Acting President could veto a law and that the Senate (and 
House) could override that veto seems inconsistent with the Acting President 
presiding.  The Acting President should not be able to have two bites at the 
apple; he should not intrude on the legislative process by presiding over the 
deliberations and then vetoing the measure presented to him. 
If this analysis is correct, it suggests that a Vice President acting as 
President could not preside over the Senate even had the president pro tempore 
clause only included the absence contingency.57  Such a Vice President would 
be acting inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution.  Thus, if a Vice 
President showed up to preside, the Senate might properly tell him to get lost, 
since the constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and 
balances compelled his absence.  Similarly, a Vice President who attempted to 
preside over his impeachment trial might also be told his absence was 
constitutionally compelled if, as I will argue below, the Constitution’s structure 
mandated his absence. 
To be sure, as Professor Paulsen points out, the Constitution specifically 
provides that the Chief Justice is to preside at the President’s trial but is silent 
 
 56. Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1997). 
 57. There is one embarrassment to this notion that the Constitution separates personnel such 
that an Acting President could not preside over the Senate even without the language in the 
president pro tempore clause.  The Vice Presidency itself seems something of a hybrid.  The 
original Constitution designated him as President of the Senate with the power to vote in case the 
Senate was deadlocked.  The early vice president was essentially a legislative officer, although to 
some extent put there by default.  The Vice Presidency was largely an expedient to facilitate the 
original electoral system.  Without that duty, founder Hugh Williamson argued, he would be 
without employment.  His power to break deadlocks gave the presidential runner-up the 
occasional power to make the House of Representatives or the President pass on legislative issues 
he favored.  In the twentieth century the vice president migrated to the executive branch, a change 
the Twenty-fifth Amendment confirmed in 1967.  See Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice 
Presidency, supra note 5, at 530, 544-46. 
  To be sure, the fact that the Vice President, this executive officer, retains a formal Senate 
role cuts against my argument that the president pro tempore clause is not the source of an acting 
president’s inability to preside over the Senate.  Clearly the Constitution tolerates, to some 
degree, an executive official presiding over the Senate.  Yet I think the wound is not too deep.  
Far from being the President’s man in the Senate, the Vice President originally was the 
presidential runner-up and, as such, likely to have been a rival of the Chief Executive.  As the 
Vice Presidency migrated to the Executive Branch, the Senate role was not repealed, but it has 
atrophied and now commands little of his time.  His power to break ties simply means the 
president wins if the Senate is evenly divided, a circumstance that rarely arises.  That outcome 
could be achieved as well by simply providing that a Senate tie goes to the President, not the 
opposition.  Moreover, no one really takes the vice president’s Senate role very seriously (except 
perhaps for law professors who write about it).  Vice Presidents openly neglect it; yet, to my 
knowledge, no one has ever seriously suggested impeaching a Vice President for this dereliction 
of duty. 
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regarding the Vice President’s.  Invoking expressio unius, Professor Paulsen 
argues that the textual silence means the Vice President can preside. 
Yet this argument credits expressio with more oomph than it has.  The 
principle of expressio unius is hardly an absolute; it is honored in the breach.  
The Constitution provides that it is supreme over contradictory state law but 
does not say it trumps federal statutes, but expressio unius has not been 
thought to defeat the principle of judicial review of statutes Congress passes.  
The Constitution provides that Congress can remove “all civil officers of the 
United States” on impeachment and conviction but does not authorize the 
President to remove cabinet officers or ambassadors, yet this power is firmly 
established.  Although expressio is occasionally invoked in constitutional cases 
it does not universally command assent.  In two recent constitutional cases, 
eight of the nine members of the Court have rejected it when it conflicted with 
other modes of constitutional argument.58  In many modern applications, 
expressio unius appears to be a weak principle of constitutional law, something 
of a makeweight.  Courts invoke it typically when some other modes of 
constitutional argument support it.  Thus, the inferences drawn are not 
dependent simply on textual silence but rest on other supports. 
Finally, expressio unius is inapplicable here because so many alternative, 
more plausible theories explain why the Constitution does not specifically 
disqualify the Vice President from presiding. That the framers made provisions 
for the impeachment trial of the President but not of the Vice President does 
not mean they did not intend that the Vice President be disqualified from 
presiding over his own trial.  They may have thought the principle that no man 
would be judge of his own trial so firmly embedded in law as to require no 
constitutional restatement.  Alternatively, they may have focused on the 
presidency because of its importance.  The Vice Presidency, which was an 
after-thought contrived in the convention’s closing days, attracted less 
attention.  Congress or the Senate could work out appropriate principles at a 
later time. 
Surely the text should be taken seriously.  But it cannot always be read 
literally when so doing leads to silly results that would frustrate its apparent 
purposes.  The Constitution provides that the Chief Justice will preside over 
the President’s impeachment trial.  Suppose there was no Chief Justice when 
the President was impeached.  Would that mean the Senate could not try the 
President?  Could the President prevent his own removal by refusing to appoint 
a Chief Justice when the job fell vacant?  Suppose the Chief Justice died or 
 
 58. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 969-70 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejects 
expressio unius argument that conflicts with historical practice; joined by Souter, Ginsburg and 
Breyer, JJ.); U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 868, 870 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejects expressio 
unius argument that conflicts with structural principal of federalism; joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
and O’Connor and Scalia, JJ.). 
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resigned during the trial; would the proceedings grind to an immediate halt?  
The text does not provide that anyone else can preside at the President’s 
impeachment trial and accordingly expressio unius would suggest the Chief 
Justice’s entitlement to be exclusive, but I would feel pretty confident that the 
senior justice would discharge that function even though the text specifically 
requires the Chief. 
V. WHERE OTHER ARGUMENTS LEAD 
The textual argument is accordingly hardly persuasive.  This frailty is fatal 
to the Vice-President-Presides thesis, for the textual argument is its only 
support.  The notion that Agnew could preside at his own impeachment is not 
simply stupid, as Professor Paulsen suggests.  We view it as misguided 
because it wars with basic structural ideas implicit in the Constitution. 
Fundamental structural principles preclude a Vice President from presiding 
over his own impeachment trial.  First, such a practice would offend ideas 
intrinsic to the notion of the rule of law, one of the fundamental concepts of 
our Constitution.59  Agnew presiding at his trial would violate the injunction 
against being judge in one’s own cause.  The principle, which dates to Dr. 
Bonham’s case,60 is deeply embedded in our common law tradition and is 
central to our jurisprudence.  James Madison articulated the aversion to self-
judging in Federalist No. 10, “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own 
cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not 
improperly, corrupt his integrity,” he wrote.61  Indeed, the Chief Justice Clause 
might be understood as articulating this concept.  Since the Vice President 
would benefit from the President’s removal, he “would be judging his own 
cause.”62 
Allowing a Vice President to preside would offend another strand of the 
rule of law.  Marbury v. Madison made clear that the rule of law requires a 
remedy for every violation of a right.63  The availability of a remedy presumes 
the possibility of a potentially effective one.  Yet the problem with self-judging 
or self-presiding is that it destroys the efficacy of the remedy.  In this respect, 
the spectre of a Vice President presiding over his own trial is even more 
objectionable than a President pardoning himself.64  Since the pardon 
specifically does not extend to impeachment, a President who tried to pardon 
himself (putting aside the question of whether he could) would still be subject 
 
 59. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 60. 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.P. 1610). 
 61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 62. Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 122. 
 63. 5 U.S. at 163. 
 64. See Kalt, supra note 13. 
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to impeachment and removal.  But the impeachment remedy could be rendered 
ineffective against a Vice President who presided at his own impeachment 
trial. 
Second, the Constitution reflects an aversion to conflicts of interest in 
impeachment proceedings.  The Court recognized as much in Nixon v. United 
States.  Courts could not review decisions in impeachments of judges, the 
Court held, because such a power “would place final reviewing authority with 
respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment 
process is meant to regulate.”65  Indeed, the requirement that the Chief Justice 
preside at the President’s impeachment trial seems to reflect this same concern.  
It would be unseemly for the vice president to preside at an impeachment 
proceeding that might oust the Chief Executive and lead to the vice president’s 
promotion.  He has a conflict of interest that offends the Constitution.  In order 
to remove any taint from so important a proceeding, the Chief Justice presides.  
But if the Constitution finds it impermissible for the Vice President to preside 
over a trial that “could vault him into the oval office,”66 the prospect of the 
Vice President presiding at his own trial would seem at least equally suspect.  
If the Constitution sees a disabling conflict when presiding unfairly might 
facilitate the Vice President’s promotion, it would seem equally offended when 
presiding might prevent his demise. 
Finally, the Constitution imposes a system of checks and balances to 
enforce constitutional limits and produce good and consensus government.  
The notion that government officials should be subject to various checks 
reflects a commitment to limited government and a belief that enforcement 
requires proper arrangement of obstacles and counter weights.  The 
Constitution imposes few checks on the Vice President (perhaps because it 
gives him little power); one such check is the prospect of impeachment.  It 
would be anomalous if the Constitution allowed him to preside over his own 
trial.67 
Not only do these structural arguments cut powerfully, indeed, 
compellingly, against the Vice-President-Presides theory.  In addition, the 
history of the period of the drafting and ratifying the original Constitution 
offers reason to believe the farmers would not have intended a Vice President 
to preside over his impeachment.  In particular, it helps explain some of the 
textual fragments in ways that undermine this thesis. 
First, the Vice Presidency was an afterthought, first proposed in the closing 
days of the Constitutional Convention.  In all likelihood, it was conceived as an 
expedient to facilitate the presidential elections.  The framers feared that 
 
 65. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 235. 
 66. Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 122. 
 67. Cf. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 234-35 (structural arguments preclude judicial review of 
impeachment, which is significant check on judiciary). 
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electors would all support their own states’ favorite son, thereby frustrating 
efforts to choose a national, unifying Chief Executive.  To control this 
temptation, they added a second vote with the proviso that electors could not 
cast both votes for home state candidates.  To induce electors to take seriously 
the second vote, they added a second office.  The framers directed little 
attention to the Vice Presidency, regarding it as a device to facilitate the 
election of a national president.68 
Moreover, the framers gave little thought to the impeachment of a Vice 
President.  They were preoccupied with impeachment of the President, 
debating the topic at length on July 20, 178769 and returning to the subject 
repeatedly during the next several weeks.70  It was not until September 4, 1787, 
that the Committee of Eleven recommended that the Vice Presidency be 
created.  It also recommended empowering the Senate to try impeachments.  
The Vice President would be ex officio President of the Senate but would not 
preside when the President was tried.  Four days later the Convention 
discussed the impeachment provisions regarding the President in some detail.  
Near the end of the debate, the Convention, for the first time, extended the 
impeachment remedy to the Vice President and the civil officers of the United 
States.71  A committee on style was appointed to clean up the prose and 
organization but without authority to fiddle with substance.  It reported a draft 
on September 12 which, with little modification, became the proposed 
Constitution five days later.72 
These historical circumstances may help explain the framers failure to 
specify that the Vice President could not preside at his own trial.  The 
historical data suggests an alternative, more plausible explanation than 
Professor Paulsen’s conclusion that “the omission [of language precluding the 
vice president from presiding at his own trial] can scarcely have been 
accidental, for the impeachment clause specifically provides that the Chief 
Justice, not the Vice President, presides when the President of the United 
States is impeached.”73  Professor Paulsen’s conclusion would make sense only 
if some parity existed between the treatment of the Presidency and Vice 
Presidency at the Constitutional Convention.  There was none.  The framers 
labored over the presidency, debating it exhaustively.  The Vice Presidency 
received little attention; impeachment of a Vice President even less.  The 
Convention had substituted the Chief Justice for the Vice President to preside 
over a presidential impeachment trial several days before it even extended 
 
 68. See Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 5, at 512-13. 
 69. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 64-69 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
 70. See John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional 
Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1970). 
 71. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 69, at 552. 
 72. See Feerick, supra note 70, at 23. 
 73. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 246. 
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impeachment to the Vice Presidency.  It is hardly surprising that under the 
circumstances the framers did not focus on the issue Professor Paulsen et al. 
raised two centuries later.  They were, no doubt, tired and hot and homesick, 
and eager to adjourn.  If they had radar screens, the question of who would 
preside at a vice-presidential impeachment would not have been anywhere on 
them.  It was a detail that slipped through the cracks in the closing days of the 
founders’ deliberations. 
To the extent Professor Paulsen believes that the “omission of any such 
exception [to the Vice President presiding over his impeachment] can scarcely 
have been accidental,”74 he is, I believe, mistaken.  It is inconceivable to 
imagine James Madison and the other founders consciously considering with 
equanimity the prospect of an impeached Vice President presiding over his 
own trial and concluding that it was good, especially given Madison’s 
opposition to self-judging.  Its omission does not reflect a conscious intent to 
distinguish between the situation of the President and the Vice President.  Had 
they thought of it, the framers surely would have provided that either the 
president pro tempore or the Chief Justice would preside over the Vice 
President’s impeachment trial. 
Or perhaps they thought they had, in fact, specifically so provided, at least 
for most occasions.  The framers conceived the Vice President as a legislative 
officer.  As such, it was unlikely that occasion would arise to remove him by 
impeachment and conviction.  The time when the Vice President would be at 
risk would be on those occasions when he exercised the office of the President.  
The weight of the evidence suggests that the framers did not intend the Vice 
President become President upon the death, resignation, removal or inability of 
his predecessor; they intended him only to exercise the powers and duties of 
the office.75  Thus, the framers conceived that when the Vice President acted as 
President, and accordingly would be most vulnerable, he could not preside 
over the Senate!  It would be odd to conclude that the framers intended the 
Chief Justice to preside when the President was tried for impeachment but not 
if the Vice President acting as president was.  More likely, the framers’ intent 
was that the President pro tempore preside whenever the Vice President acted 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION 39-56 (1965); Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 5, at 516-
18; Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 118. 
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as President but that the Chief Justice76 would preside over the impeachment 
trial of the President or Vice President acting as President.77 
The Vice President has evolved into an officer of the Executive Branch.  
He rarely presides over the Senate, except on ceremonial occasions or to break 
ties in favor of the Administration.  In view of this ongoing history, it would be 
anomalous if he sought to preside over a substantive event as momentous as 
his own trial! 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Vice President-Presides thesis illustrates the fallacy of textualism 
pushed to extremes.  To the extent the text supports that theory, it does so 
inferentially, not explicitly, and only if the reader accepts three questionable 
propositions: a) the President of the Senate Clause means the Vice President 
can always preside unless the Constitution, in explicit language, precludes him 
from doing so; b) absence, in the President Pro Tempore Clause, is absence 
from the chamber, not the presiding chair; and c) expressio unius can support a 
totally anomalous result when invoked with no other support.  Even if the 
interpreter makes these moves, she has still not established the thesis.  For the 
interpreter must also accept the proposition that the textual argument is 
sufficiently strong to ignore the structural arguments that explode it and the 
historical data that tends to impeach it. 
“[W]e must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding,” Chief 
Justice Marshall reminded us.78  If it is to endure for the ages, as he told us was 
the idea, it must continue to command the respect and assent of the people.  
That it will not do if it is construed in ways that violate basic structural 
 
 76. Since the Presidential Succession Act of 1792 placed the Senate President pro tempore 
after the Vice President in the line of succession, an additional reason then existed to prefer the 
case of Justices as presiding officers over a vice-presidential trial.  The present law places the 
Speaker of the House ahead of the President pro tempore of the Senate.  The ability of the 
President to fill a vice-presidential vacancy with approval of the House and Senate, see U.S. 
CONST. amend. XXV, § 2, minimizes the possible conflict of a president pro tempore presiding.  
Thus, I think Dean Feerick’s suggestion that the president pro tempore will preside is very 
reasonable, and especially compelling when the vice president is not the Acting President. 
 77. To be sure, this history does not specifically address Agnew’s situation.  In our 
hypothetical, he was not impeached for offenses committed while acting as President but (in part) 
as Vice President.  Yet, the facts may be closer than suggested above.  Under the framers’ design,  
when the Vice President exercised the Presidency he became an executive officer who could not 
preside over the Senate.  If then impeached, he specifically could not preside over his 
impeachment.  This reinforces the idea that whenever the Vice President is impeached as an 
executive officer, he cannot preside over the proceedings. This reading brings the theory close to 
Agnew’s situation.  For Agnew, in the hypothetical, was impeached for actions taken in part as 
Vice President.  Of course, for other reasons he cannot preside, regardless of the basis of his 
impeachment. 
 78. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819). 
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commitments and accordingly produce results that are fundamentally dubious.  
To be sure, real constitutional stupidities may exist which the text makes so 
compelling that an interpreter cannot escape.  When that occurs, we can expect 
to see the text reinforced by other modes of constitutional argument—the 
framers’ intent, ongoing history, judicial doctrine, structural concepts, 
pragmatism.  But, there is no need to accept without challenge a conclusion as 
problematic as the Vice President-Presides thesis which rests on a naked, and 
not very convincing, textualism at odds with all other constitutional arguments.  
The Constitution would not support an effort of a Vice President to preside 
over his own impeachment. 
 
